By: Seán Kreyling
*This article originally appeared in the July 2010 issue of the Journal of Energy Security under the title “Understanding Resource Nationalism in the 21st Century.” This version has the endnotes that were not included in the original publication.
By
Llewelyn Hughes
Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs
George Washington University
Seán J. Kreyling
Research Scientist, Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
“So we have a choice to make. We can remain one of the world’s leading importers of foreign oil, or we can make the investments that would allow us to become the world’s leading exporter of renewable energy …We can let the jobs of tomorrow be created abroad, or we can create those jobs right here in America and lay the foundation for lasting prosperity.” [1]
Statement on the official web site for the White House and President Barack Obama
1. Introduction
Resource nationalism in oil-importing states appears to be on the rise.[2] Oil price volatility underpinned by demand growth has led China, India and others to increase state support for national-flag firms in order to increase the state’s energy self-sufficiency. Both Chinese and Indian National Oil Companies (NOCs) have made energy investments worldwide, including in Sudan and Iran.[3] Long-standing oil importers such as the United States and Japan have also reenergized policies designed to increase domestic production of crude and crude substitutes, or have subsidized national-flag firms, in the name of energy independence.
A common explanation for this behavior proposes that policymakers view oil imports as a national security and foreign policy risk and decide energy independence is an appropriate response. But are there other ways we might account for these actions? In this paper we suggest that the national security explanation by itself is inadequate, as it ignores the complexity of business-government relations, and the diversity in preferences held by political and corporate decisionmakers. Studies in the politics of trade demonstrate that government intervention is not only driven by public policy goals, but also the interests of domestic constituents.[4] That domestic political interests partially drive energy politics in the United States, may not surprise analysts of U.S. politics. Such considerations are less commonly used in analyses of other countries’ energy policies, however, where explanations tend to focus on resource nationalism as an explanation, rather than the influence of firms, bureaucratic interests, legislators’ responsibilities to their constituents, budgetary politics, the role of industry associations and civil society, or other factors, in explaining energy policy outcomes.[5]
Specifically, states are commonly treated as if they were unitary actors.[6] (e.g., China makes energy investments in Africa, the United States decides to resume off-shore drilling, etc.) While this simplification has some utility, it neglects the fact that the state is not unitary, but is rather an aggregation of various actors, including industry, and non-governmental organizations, with the constellation of relevant actors varying widely, depending on the issue. Given this, we argue that energy security analyses that focus on the national security and foreign policy objectives of a state’s international relations must be supplemented by a consideration of the intranational relationships and mechanisms from which a state’s policies emerge. [7] Alternative conceptual models are therefore required to understand the extent to which a state is actually pursuing policies consistent with resource nationalism.
In the next section we propose a framework for understanding resource nationalism in oil-importing states. We illustrate the plausibility of our argument using two case studies taken from the United States. We focus on the United States because information is comparatively transparent. The case studies are not definitive, but are intended to suggest business-government relations are plausibly a factor in the creation of energy policy. We nevertheless believe this framework is useful for explaining energy policies cross-nationally, despite variation across institutional and regulatory settings. We conclude by discussing the implications for our understanding of the relationship between oil and national security.
2. Framing the Geopolitics of Oil
Resource nationalism is not a new problem. Guaranteeing supplies of oil and oil products was central to government policies in the early part of the twentieth century, both to ensure military operations were not compromised and that key industrial sectors of the civilian economies remained viable.[8] A variety of responses were implemented by oil-importing states, most notably fuel diversification and demand management. One additional strategy sought to enhance self-sufficiency by supporting national-flag companies or investing in substitutes that could be produced domestically.
What drives governments to adopt similar policies today? A common argument assumes the state is insulated from the demands of firms or other socioeconomic groups, and that it is seeking to maximize national security goals. Policies such as subsidizing national flag firms, purchasing of exploration rights upstream, or using diplomatic instruments are then understood to be a function of states’ desires to insure against the risk of oil supply disruptions.
An Alternative Framework for Analyzing Resource Nationalism
An alternative framework relaxes these assumptions by taking into account insights drawn from work on the political economy of trade. Instead of assuming that policy outcomes are driven by policymakers, for example, we can assume policies are the result of bargaining between states and firms. We can also assume that firms drive policies through a process of regulatory capture.[9] Further, we can relax the assumption that policymakers are maximizing national security-related goals, and instead assume they are seeking to maximize budgetary or electoral goals. Doing so yields four potential explanations for understanding resource nationalism in oil importing states (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Framing Resource Nationalism and its Alternatives in Oil Importing States
I. Resource Nationalism
National policy is determined by policymakers within the state, who are insulated from the influence of firms and seek to enhance national security by increasing the share of crude produced by national-flag companies. Firms act as the agents of policymakers, and policymakers are able to control these firms, ensuring they act in the interests of the state.
II. Resource Politicization
National policy is determined by policymakers, who are insulated from the demands of firms. Policymakers may be seeking to enhance national security; however they may also be seeking to maximize campaign contributions, budgetary allocations, or some other set of goals. Promoting domestic oil drilling within the continental United States, for example, may serve a set of electoral goals in addition to, or instead of, enhancing national security. Alternatively, emphasizing security threats to energy supplies may also help navies successfully negotiate inter-branch rivalries. If budgets are limited and policymakers must choose between supporting different missions, for example, fears surrounding vulnerable energy supplies provide a useful justification for investment in naval platforms to secure oil transportation routes rather than in programs supported by other branches.[10]
III. Negotiated Nationalism
The principal-agent problem informs the third and fourth alternative models. In the third model, policymakers maximize national security goals, but are forced to negotiate with firms to achieve their preferred outcome. Firms are imperfect agents of the state, pursuing a different set of interests. States, on the other hand, are the principals, but can only monitor firm behavior imperfectly. Decisions on whether to invest in a given field, for example, are highly technical – meaning policymakers may not possess the necessary information to ensure the firms’ actions are in line with state interests.
IV. Politics and Profits
Policymakers negotiate the implementation of policies with firms, and are not assumed to be necessarily seeking to enhance national security. Instead, they pursue reelection, employment or economic growth-related goals. Further, they negotiate with firms-as-agents when implementing policies. Policies are therefore a bargained outcome between policymakers and firms, the former seeking some set of goals unrelated to national security, and the latter seeking profits.
3. Empirics
How might we use this framework to analyze policy outcomes? An exhaustive test of predictions drawn from these models is beyond the scope of this paper. We instead offer two case studies from the United States: the 2005 CNOOC-Unocal case, and federal support for corn-based ethanol. The stylized facts presented below are not intended to provide definitive conclusions. Rather, our goal is to establish that the models above offer plausible alternatives for understanding outcomes.
I. China and the China National Offshore Oil Corp.’s Bid for Unocal Policies
On April 4, 2025 Chevron announced an agreement to acquire the Los Angeles-based firm, Union Oil of California (Unocal), for $16.5 billion. On June 23, 2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) made an unsolicited bid to acquire Unocal for $18.5 billion in cash. CNOOC’s offer was opposed by some members of Congress. Rep. Joe Barton (R-Texas), then the Chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee argued that it was against American “strategic interests to let a front company for the communist Chinese purchase a strategic asset, which in this case would be oil reserves and pipelines in the United States.”[11] Rep. Richard Pombo (R-California) joined Rep. Barton in opposing the CNOOC-Unocal merger, stating “[w]e cannot afford to have a major U.S. energy supplier controlled by the Communist Chinese. If we allow this sale to go forward we are taking a huge risk.”[12] U.S. politicians were not alone in citing national security grounds in their opposition to the deal. Peter J. Robertson, Chevron’s vice chairman at the time, noted that if the CNOOC-Unocal merger was approved the new Chinese-backed firm might “strategically focus” Unocal’s oil and natural gas assets toward China, potentially restricting supply to the rest of Asia.[13]
Members of Congress responded to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal with legislative action. On June 30, 2025 the House of Representatives passed House Amendment 431. Proposed by Rep. Carolyn Kilpatrick (D-Michigan), this amendment to the annual House appropriations bill prohibited the Treasury Department from using federal funds in recommending the sale of Unocal to CNOOC.[14] The amendment passed by a vote of 333-92. On July 15, 2025 Senate Bill 1412 was introduced, which would have prohibited the acquisition of Unocal by CNOOC. Rep. Pombo sponsored a resolution to the bill, approved in the House by a vote of 398-15, which stated that Chinese ownership of Unocal could “threaten to impair the national security of the United States” and that if Unocal’s board approved CNOOC’s bid, President Bush should conduct a “thorough review.”[15] Lastly, Rep. Pombo also sponsored the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Section 1837 of that act required the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to study the growing energy requirements of China and the implications of this growth for the political, strategic, economic, and national security interests of the United States.[16]
While the U.S. Congress does not have the authority to block foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms on national security grounds, the executive branch does – an authority granted to it by the Exon-Florio provision of the Defense Production Act and carried out by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).[17] On August 2, 2005, however, CNOOC announced that it was withdrawing its bid to acquire Unocal before any investigation by CFIUS was initiated. In its press release CNOOC credited increased political risk for its decision to withdraw.[18]
Motivations
An important rationale cited by opposition to the proposed acquisition of Unocal by CNOOC was national security.[19] The connection of Unocal to U.S. security of oil supplies, however, is tenuous. If the Unocal-CNOOC acquisition had proceeded the new firm would have constituted one percent of U.S. national gas consumption (2004 figures), while oil production would have been approximately 0.3 percent of domestic consumption.”[20]
How then, might we explain this outcome? One plausible explanation lies in the importance of economic growth and employment in the United States to policymakers. A 2009 report found that the oil and gas sector accounts for approximately 65,000 oil and gas related jobs in California. The report also attributed an additional 304,500 jobs indirectly by the consumption of goods and services from both oil and gas firms in the state, as well as by their employees. This indirect employment adds a further $16.3 billion in workers’ earnings, and $46.3 billion in total economic output. Chevron itself employed approximately 10,000 workers in California in 2007, contributing $4.5 billion to the state’s economy. The report concluded that Chevron supported a total of 68,700 jobs, or about 1 in every 250 jobs in California in 2007, generating $3.9 billion in employee earnings and $9.2 billion in output. [21]
In addition to the political relevance of employment and growth, government intervention also shifted the competitive position of firms engaged in the battle over Unocal by raising the regulatory risk for CNOOC associated with pursuing the proposed acquisition of Unocal for CNOOC. At least as early as 2004, Chevron identified that a merger with Unocal would increase Chevron’s presence in the Asia-Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, Central Asia and elsewhere. It would also increase Chevron’s reserves by 1.75 billion barrels of oil equivalent, and daily production by 459 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day.[22]
The high number of votes in favor of legislation impeding CNOOC’s ability to acquire Unocal, on the other hand, suggests that state-level employment goals or commercial interests are unlikely to be the only factors to shape congressional voting. The CNOOC bid for Unocal occurred, for example, when Congress was increasingly concerned about the challenge Chinese firms presented U.S. industry.[23] Members of Congress noted concerns with the proposed acquisition, concerns that were unrelated to energy security. Sen. Byron Dorgan’s (D-North Dakota) proposed resolution, for example, opposed the acquisition not only because of the strategic character of oil and gas, but also because of problems of competition such as the inability of investors based in the United States to acquire a controlling interest in CNOOC, and because CNOOC was substantially financed by capital from the Chinese state or state-owned banks.
The proposed resolution also referenced the effect a CNOOC acquisition of Unocal might have on human rights and labor conditions in countries in which Unocal operated.[24] The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) has long standing concerns regarding the unfair trade practices in China that, according to the AFL-CIO, lead to job loss in the United States along with lower U.S. wages and exploitation of U.S. workers.[25] In 2004, the AFL-CIO filed the first “workers’ rights” case against the Chinese government itself.[26] It is reasonable to conclude that some members of Congress might have shared the concerns of the AFL-CIO regarding Chinese firms and voted against CNOOC’s attempted acquisition on these grounds.
No definitive conclusion can be reached in this short discussion about what motivated congressional action over the CNOOC bid for Unocal, however, the evidence suggests a mix of motives among legislators existed, including regional economic concerns and employment figures. The high level of legislator support for initiatives constraining CNOOC’s bid to acquire Unocal suggests other legislator motives, however, including concern over energy security, dissatisfaction with China’s own inward investment regime in the oil and gas sectors, and broader concerns about China’s growing economic importance. Overall, it is reasonable to infer that legislator interests, unrelated to national security, may have influenced the nature of the policy decision that finally emerged; the strong opposition to the CNOOC bid, as evidenced by the overwhelming votes, suggests model two usefully describes outcomes, in which policymakers are more important in shaping outcomes, but seek to achieve goals other than enhance energy security.
II. Corn-Based Ethanol for Transportation Fuel Policies
Ethanol is the most widely used liquid biofuel globally.[27] The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates biofuels will meet five percent of world road-transport energy demand by 2030, up from two percent today. The IEA projects biofuel demand to rise from 0.8 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2008 to 1.6 mb/d in 2015 and 2.7 mb/d by 2030.[28]
Biofuels are also expected to play an increasingly important role in U.S. fuel diversification, with ethanol being one of the few near-term substitutes for liquid transportation fuels.[29] The U.S. ethanol industry produced 10.6 billion gallons in 2009 with 170 ethanol refineries in operation, and another 24 under construction.[30] Total annual ethanol production capacity in the United States, including idled capacity, is estimated at 12.5 billion gallons. U.S. ethanol production reached 787,000 barrels per day (b/d) in December 2009, a 131,000 b/d increase year-on-year. Ethanol is estimated to account for over 17 percent of U.S. gasoline consumption by 2035.[31]
This growth in U.S. ethanol capacity is underpinned by substantial government intervention. Support for alcohol fuels in the United States originated in the Energy Tax Act of 1978 and has since grown to more than $11 billion. [32] Currently, the largest single energy-related tax expenditure is associated with ethanol - the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit[33] (VEETC) – which in 2007 provided over $3 billion in support to registered ethanol blenders. Additional government support is evidenced by the introduction of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) in the United States’ Energy Policy Act of 2005, which mandates renewable fuel use in gasoline and its passage resulted in gasoline producers making a significant shift from methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), a popular fuel additive, to ethanol in May 2006.[34] The RFS was further expanded in The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which set a mandate to raise renewable fuel use to 36 billion gallons by 2022. More recently the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (i.e. the 2008 Farm Act) reduced the tax credit for ethanol blending from 51 cents per gallon to 45 cents per gallon. This reduction came into force in 2009.
Motivations
Federal support for corn-based ethanol is justified in terms of reducing the reliance on international markets for the supply of oil.[35] The United States began to subsidize the use of ethanol in 1978 in response to oil market volatility.[36] In 2007 Tom Daschle, a former Democratic Senator from South Dakota and former Senate Majority Leader in the U.S. Congress defended corn-based ethanol by arguing that that “converting the starch from a portion of the U.S. corn crop into biofuels is an efficient way to reduce the United States’ dangerous dependence on imported oil.”[37]
Critics of corn-based ethanol argue the conversion of corn into biofuel is an inefficient way of increasing U.S. energy security. C. Ford Runge and Benjamin Senauer, for example, observe that even if every acre in the United States currently devoted to growing corn is used for the production of ethanol, this would meet only 12-15 percent of the United States’ transportation fuel needs. They also question whether corn-based ethanol can be a platform for advanced biofuels (i.e., cellulosic and waste based fuels) given crops like switchgrass are not currently economically competitive.
What alternatives exist to help explain this policy outcome, given these counterclaims? Should we accept that energy independence drives U.S. government policy, or that policy emerges as a result of more a more complicated set of domestic preferences?
Once again, one plausible alternative answer is that subsidies for ethanol-based biofuels are driven, at least in part, by political goals associated with regional economic growth and employment. Ethanol production in the United States supports approximately 400,000 jobs in all sectors of the U.S. economy and contributed $53.3 billion to the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[38] These benefits are concentrated geographically; with the majority of U.S. ethanol production capacity is located in five states: Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and South Dakota, which produced approximately nine billion gallons last year. In the case of Minnesota, the Minnesota Department of Agriculture estimates that the state’s ethanol industry produced about one billion gallons of ethanol in 2007, had a total economic impact of nearly $12 billion dollars and provided more than 70,000 jobs.[39] According to the Minnesota Corn Growers Association, the state’s ethanol industry helps local communities thrive, by offering employment, an increased tax base and better prices for corn. [40]
The existence of these distributive benefits provides a strong incentive to develop biofuels as a substitute for oil products that relates to regional employment and economic growth as much as to national security. In addition, firms also benefit from state support for ethanol production – either in terms of bolstering domestic demand, or in limiting foreign competition. In the first instance, when coupled with the Renewable Fuel Standard, the VEETC creates what a leading industry association calls a “market-based, demand enhancement,” which provides assurances to investors that there will be continued demand for ethanol which, in turn, should spur further capital investment in domestic firms.[41] In the second, because foreign firms are eligible to receive the VEETC, a secondary tariff is imposed on imported ethanol to offset that benefit. This secondary tariff is set at 54 cents per gallon (plus a 2.5 percent ad valorem tax), which incidentally, is higher than the current 45 cents per gallon tax credit in the VEETC.[42] Therefore, even if this tariff is intended to offset the VEETC, because of its design, it represents a substantial protective measure for domestic firms.
As with the case of Unocal-CNOOC, legislative support in favor of federal subsidies for corn-based ethanol suggests that legislator motivations expand beyond a concern only for regional employment and economic growth. Nevertheless, while justified for reasons of energy independence, there is plausible evidence to support the contention that regional employment and other economic opportunities for constituents may be goals in of policy in addition to enhancing national security. This suggests that models two and four offer plausible alternative frameworks for understanding federal support for biofuels.
4. Conclusion and Extensions
Energy policies in oil importing states are commonly framed in terms of securing energy supplies. Yet the brief cases presented above suggest it is plausible that policymakers, firms, and others, are seeking to achieve goals other than enhancing energy independence, regardless of rhetoric. Policymakers may have multiple reasons for supporting policies that can be characterized as resource nationalism, including regional economic growth or employment-related goals. Commercial outcomes are also significantly affected by government intervention in oil markets, meaning firms are likely to seek to shape policy outcomes. Rather than accept the assumption that resource nationalism is driven by decisionmakers within government who are primarily concerned about national security, and are insulated from firms and other interest groups, it is therefore incumbent on analysts of energy policies to probe the empirical basis for the assumption. This requires us to consider other possible motivations that drive decisionmaking, as well as the instruments available to firms to influence policies, and the mechanisms available to policymakers to align state and firm interests.
How might we extend these frameworks to energy security policies in other countries? This paper has focused on case studies drawn from the United States, where policymaking in the energy sector is comparatively transparent. The existence of substantial domestic resources, and a federal system of government with mutual vetoes between the executive and legislative branches of government, substantially complicates the design and implementation of energy policy. This makes interest group politics, and domestic political incentives, plausibly different from those in states that have few domestic resources available to exploit, or with more unified systems of decision-making.
Mixed incentives should nevertheless also hold across countries and political regimes – even when national oil companies dominate a state’s energy sector. In the case of China, for example, analysis suggests that investment decisions by Chinese firms are made independently from the government and that the Chinese state itself is not a unified actor but is rather made up of a number of different bureaucratic agencies with different capacities and policy preferences.[43] While the incentives faced by policymakers makers and the structure of bargaining between industry and political actors is likely to vary from country to country, therefore, we should not assume that a unitary state model in which fears of energy security drive policy outcomes is the appropriate framework through which to understand resource nationalism in oil-importing states.
Instead, analysts should focus on identifying the incentives facing firms and policymakers, as well as the mechanisms of influence between the government and firms. Data such as sources of firm financing, government representation in firm management, and personnel practices, for example, are likely to be useful in identifying the instruments available to policymakers to change the incentives facing firms. Examining the organizational incentives of policymakers with competency in the energy sector, as well as the domestic institutions that govern decision-making, are also likely to help establish the relative importance of firms and policymakers in determining outcomes, and what policymakers are seeking to maximize.
[1] Official Web Site for the White House and President Barack Obama. Issues. Energy & Environment. Accessed May13, 2010 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/energy-and-environment/
[2] R.W. Click and R.J. Weiner. 2010. Resource Nationalism Meets the Market: Political Risk and the Value of Petroleum Reserves. Journal of International Business Studies Vol. 41: 783–803. In addition to numerous press reports, see Klare MT. 2001. “The New Geography of Conflict.” Foreign Affairs 80(3): 49-61; Zweig, D and B Jianhai. 2005. “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” 84(5):25-38; Amb. Jones RH. 2009. “The emerging petroleum and natural gas economy.”Energy Security: A Global Challenge. Presentation at National Defense University; Gen. Clark W. (ret). 2009. “Interview by Steve Paikin with Gen. (ret.) Wesley Clark on Energy Security.” The Agenda – Television Ontario. Accessed on May 10, 2025 at http://www.tvo.org/cfmx/tvoorg/theagenda/index.cfm?page_id=7&bpn=779628&ts=2009-10-05%2020:00:00.0
[3] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis – Oil.” Accessed May 10, 2025 at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html; “Sudan Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis – Oil.” Accessed May 10, 2025 at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sudan/Oil.html.
[4] Most of this work in the U.S. context focuses on trade. The classic statement on trade is Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. Protection for Sale. The American Economic Review Vol. 84, (4): 833-850. On national security, economic interests, and congressional voting see Richard Fleischer. 1993. PAC Contributions and Congressional Voting on National Defense. Legislative Studies Quarterly Vol. 18 (3): 391-409.
[5] Exceptions to the focus on resource nationalism as an explanation for policy outcomes in oil-importing states include Liou C-S. 2009. “Bureaucratic Politics and Overseas Investment by Chinese State-Owned Oil Companies.” Asian Survey 49(4):670-690; Erica S. Downs. 2007. “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations.” China Security 3:42-68; Lee H and Shalmon D. “Searching for Oil: China’s Oil Strategies in Africa.” 2008. China into Africa: Aid, Trade and Influence 109-136.
[6] This is a specific reference to Graham Allison’s and Philip Zelikow’s “Rational Actor Model”, as defined in their book Essence of Decision (see citation below).
[7] Allison, G. and Zelikow, P. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed.. Reading, Mass.: Longman. P. 5.
[8] For an overview see Francisco R. Parra. 2004. Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum. London; New York: I.B. Tauris.
[9] Stigler GJ. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1):3-21.
[10] See, for example, Erickson A and L Goldstein. 2009. “Gunboats for China’s New “Grand Canals? Probing the Intersection of Beijing’s Naval and Oil Security Policies.” Naval War College Review 62(2):43-76.
[11] Rep. Joe Barton. 2005. Republican House Energy and Commerce Committee website, July 1, 2005. “CNN: Lou Dobbs Tonight, Barton Discusses Chinese Bid for Unocal.” Accessed April 19, 2025 at http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/07012005_1582.htm.
[12] Barrionuevo, A. July 1, 2005. The New York Times: “Foreign Suitors Nothing New in U.S. Oil Patch.” Accessed March 17, 2025 at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/01/business/worldbusiness/01unocal.html?_r=1
[13] Barrionuevo, A. The New York Times, “Foreign Suitors Nothing New in U.S. Oil Patch,” July 1, 2005. Accessed March 17, 2025 at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/01/business/worldbusiness/01unocal.html?_r=1
[14] House Amendment 431. (Kilpatrick) to H.R. 3058 (Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006). This Act prohibits the use of funds from being made available to recommend approval of the sale of Unocal Corporation to CNOOC Ltd. of China. Amendment agreed to on June 30, 2005.
[15] H.RES. 344, Representative Richard W Pombo. [CA-11] (introduced June 29, 2025). Accessed March 17, 2025 at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d109:8:./temp/~bdtWNT:@@@D&summ2=m&.
[16] Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 1837. Signed into law Aug 8, 2005.
[17] CFIUS is housed in the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
[18] CNOOC, Ltd. Hong Kong. August 2, 2005. Press Release: “CNOOC Ltd. To Withdraw Unocal Bid.” Accessed April, 20, 2010 at http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/newszx/news/2005/961.shtml
[19] Petrusic M. 2005. “Oil and National Security: CNOOC’s Failed Bid to Purchase Unocal.” North Carolina Law Review 84:1373.
[20] Nanto DK, JK Jackson, WM Morrison, and L Kumins. September 15, 2005. Congressional Research Service, RL33093 - “China and the CNOOC Bid for Unocal: Issues for Congress.”
[21] The report was prepared by The Milken Institute and was funded by Chevron. Ross DeVol, Perry Wong, et. al. The Milken Institute, 2009. “Energizing California: Mapping Chevron’s Economic Impacts on the Golden State,” p. 1.
[22] Chevron Corporation, “Chevron–Unocal Merger Fact Sheet.” Accessed March 16, 2025 at http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/merger_fact_sheet.pdf.
[23] Lemon S. January 27, 2005. “Concerns Mount Over Lenovo’s IBM Deal.” PC World. Accessed March 22, 2025 at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,119476,00.asp.
[24] Casselman JW. 2007. “China’s Latest Threat to the United States: The Failed CNOOC-Unocal Merger and Its Implications for Exon-Florio and CFIUS.” Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 17:155-186; McGill K. 2006. “Selling Away Our Oil: Protectionism and the True Threat Raised By CNOOC’s Attempted Acquisition of Unocal.” Georgia State University Law Review 23:657-680; Petrusic M. 2005. “Oil and National Security: CNOOC’s Failed Bid to Purchase Unocal.” North Carolina Law Review 84:1373-1393.
[25] American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). “The AFL-CIO Workers’ Rights Case Against China.” Accessed April 20, 2025 at http://www.afl-cio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/chinapetition.cfm.
[26] Ibid.
[27] U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Biofuels in the U.S. Transportation Sector.” Accessed March 1, 2025 at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/biomass.html
[28] The International Energy Agency. 2009. World Energy Outlook 2009. p. 87.
[29] The Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), U.S. Department of Energy, “About the Biomass Program: National Energy Security.” Updated: October 16, 2007. Accessed March 1, 2025 at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/national_energy_security.html.
[30] Renewable Fuels Association, Biorefinery Locations. Accessed March 3, 2025 at http://www.ethanolrfa.org/bio-refinery-locations/.
[31] Newell R, EIA Administrator, Presentation at SAIS, December 14, 2009. Slide 23. Accessed April 27, 2025 at http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/speeches/newell121409.ppt.
[32] For a brief timeline of ethanol production and related government policy in the United States, go to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s “Energy Timeline - Ethanol” page at http://www.eia.doe.gov/kids/energy.cfm?page=tl_ethanol.
[33] According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2008 report on Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Markets 2007, OMB does not define VEETC as a tax expenditure. OMB presents this reduction in tax receipts as a footnote to the Tax Expenditure Table appearing in OMB, Analytical Perspectives of the United States Budget 2008. Table 19-1. Table 19-1 reports a $50 million tax expenditure for fuel alcohol tax credits and $2.99 billion in foregone excise tax revenue due to VEETC. See EIA’s Monthly Energy Review, DOE/EIA-0035(200712) (Washington, DC, December 2007), Table 10.3 for fuel ethanol production data.
[34] Economic Research Service. 2008. “Feed Year in Review (Domestic): Record Demand Drives U.S. Feed Grain Prices Higher in 2007/08.” U.S. Department of Agriculture. Accessed March 1, 2025 at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/ers/FDS-yearbook/2000s/2008/FDS-yearbook-05-23-2008_Special_Report.pdf
[35] The Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), U.S. Department of Energy, “About the Biomass Program: National Energy Security.” Updated: October 16, 2007. Accessed March 1, 2025 at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/national_energy_security.html
[36] Bruce Gardner. 2007. Fuel Ethanol Subsidies and Farm Price Support. Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 5 No. 2.
[37] Daschle T, CF Runge, and B Senauer. 2007. “Food for Fuel?” Foreign Affairs September/October.
[38] Renewable Fuels Association. 2010. 2010 Ethanol Industry Outlook, p.4.
[39] Minnesota Department of Agriculture. 2008. “Economic Impact of the Corn and Ethanol Industry in Minnesota.” Accessed on May 13, 2025 at http://www.mda.state.mn.us/news/publications/renewable/ethanol/cornethanolecon2008.pdf
[40] Minnesota Corn Growers Association. 2010. “Ethanol & Renewable Bio-Fuels.” Accessed on 13, May, 2010 at http://www.mncorn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=58
[41] Renewable Fuels Association, Federal Tax Incentives: VEETC. Accessed 21 June, 2010 at http://www.ethanolrfa.org/pages/federal-tax-incentives-veetc.
[42] Urbanchuk, J. 2010. Technical Director, ENTRIX, Inc. “Importance of the VEETC to the U.S. Economy and the Ethanol Industry,” Prepared for the Renewable Fuels Association. Accessed on 21 June, 2010 at http://www.ethanolrfa.org/page/-/rfa-association-site/Importance%20of%20VEETC%20to%20Economy.pdf?nocdn=1.
[43] Chih-shian L. 2009. Bureaucratic Politics And Overseas Investment By Chinese State-Owned Oil Companies: Illusory Champions Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 4: 670-690; Downs, E. 2007. “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations.” China Security 3:42-68; Lee H and Shalmon D. “Searching for Oil: China’s Oil Strategies in Africa.” 2008. China into Africa: Aid, Trade and Influence 109-136; Constantin, C. 2007. “Understanding China’s Energy Security,” World Political Science Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 3, Article 2.
Tags: China, energy security, Foreign Policy, geopolitics, Llewelyn Hughes, oil, Sean J Kreyling
Related Posts:
Post a Comment