Roguely Stated

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), minority leader on the Foreign Relations Committee, reversed his long-time support of the Iraq war earlier this week, advocating for a major shift in U.S. strategy and a draw-down of troops as soon as possible. David Kilcullen, Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor for the Multinational Force in Iraq, returned from nearly six weeks on the ground there with a message of optimism about the surge, grounded in operational realities. Their two messages are toe-to-toe on some points, hand-in-hand on others. Both are worth a close read. (Lugar | Kilcullen)

The Surge: powerful, or blackout?

Lugar, keeping his eye on key national interests, argues that “the current surge strategy is not an effective means of protecting these interests.”

Many of his reasons are valid. The surge, he says, is

Kilcullen pushes back with two main arguments.

First, the surge hasn’t started yet; to date, operations have been placing surge troops on the ground. They’re ready to roll soon, and real results will start to emerge within several months.

Second, the surge isn’t just “more of the same.” It’s a new operational strategy based on key lessons learned in combating insurgencies. Kilcullen argues that rather than chasing Al Qaeda troops around the country like a game of whack-a-mole, the surge will knock insurgents out of key areas simultaneously and for a sustained period, letting U.S. and Iraqi forces work with local populations. As the excerpts below show, the key to success is separating the insurgents from the population. Oil from water?

This is why claims that “80% of AQ leadership have fled” don’t overly disturb us: the aim is not to kill every last AQ leader, but rather to drive them off the population and keep them off, so that we can work with the community to prevent their return. …

(a.) The enemy needs the people to act in certain ways … Unless the population acts in these ways, both insurgents and terrorists will wither, and the cycle of provocation and backlash that drives the sectarian conflict in Iraq will fail. …

(b.) The enemy is fluid, but the population is fixed. …

(c.) Being fluid, the enemy can control his loss rate and therefore can never be eradicated by purely enemy-centric means: he can just go to ground if the pressure becomes too much. BUT, because he needs the population to act in certain ways in order to survive, we can asphyxiate him by cutting him off from the people. …

(d.) The enemy may not be identifiable, but the population is. … We could do (and have done, in the past) enormous damage to potential supporters, “destroying the haystack to find the needle”, but we don’t need to: we know who the population is that we need to protect, we know where they live, and we can protect them without unbearable disruption to their lives. And more to the point, we can help them protect themselves, with our forces and ISF in overwatch.

Lugar hits a triple

Lugar raises three critical issues that demand attention. Too often, they are forgotten admist the heated debate over operations of the day, the surge, and when U.S. troops should withdraw.

1. When it comes to revamping overall strategy, time is of the essence: “We are running out of time to implement a thoughtful Plan B that attempts to protect our substantial interests in the region, while downsizing our military presence in Iraq.”

2. Events in Iraq are a big part of the problem, but the military’s state of affairs at home is a fundamental underlying cause:

The swearing-in ceremony [Lugar attended in Indiana] was preceded by a briefing from Army officials here in Washington who assured me that we are fielding the best equipped, best trained, and most capable force we have ever had. Yet, they also reported that the Army has exhausted its bench. Instead of resting and training for 3 to 12 months, brigades coming out of the field must now be ready almost immediately for redeployment.

Basic recruiting targets are being met, but statistics point to significant declines in the percentage of recruits who have high school diplomas and who score above average on the Army’s aptitude test. Meanwhile, the Army has dramatically increased the use of waivers for recruits who have committed felonies, and it has relaxed weight and age standards.

3. Withdrawing troops takes time. On this point, at least, Luger and Kilcullen seem to agree. The debate over withdrawal risks being too short-sighted if leaders on both sides of the aisle and at both ends of Pennsylvania Ave. don’t consider what withdrawal looks like.

Advocates of an immediate withdrawal have tended to underestimate the requirements and complexities of such an operation. General Barry McCaffrey testified at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on January 18, 2007, that an immediate withdrawal aimed at getting out of Iraq as fast as possible would take six months. A carefully planned withdrawal that sought to preserve as much American equipment as possible, protect Iraqis who have worked with us, continue anti-terrorist operations during the withdrawal period, and minimize negative regional consequences would take months longer.

Lugar and Kilcullen agree on some points and disagree on others. On the surge, though, it’s pretty clear that Kilcullen is down one ally.