Roguely Stated

I’m no business expert, but aren’t “retention incentives” supposed to make people want to stay? Not according to the Army, judging from this sneak peek of its much anticipated “incentive program.” The plan, in theory, is designed to stop the mass exodus of young officers leaving the military after multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, modest compensation, and little time at home. To the Army’s credit, the incentive options–which include a $20,000 cash bonus, graduate school, or choice of assignment–are certainly a distinct (and refreshing) change in strategy. The benefits go to some very deserving individuals, and senior military leadership had only recently begun to acknowledge the growing personnel shortage–much less do anything to counteract it. But don’t believe everything you read when the plan is officially unveiled on Monday. Here’s what the speeches and media coverage won’t tell you:

1. Too little, too late: A one-time $20,000 “cash bonus” (BEFORE taxes) in exchange for a multi-year committment (and several guaranteed combat tours) is painfully insufficient, especially when compared to other competing incentives in the private sector. Consider this: Even with the bonus factored in, the average Captain (often in charge of over 100 personnel) still makes less than $50,000 per year (plus tax breaks and $225 per month for time deployed to combat zones). While average pay for enlisted personnel is even worse, nowhere is the lack of incentives as clear as for officers. These young men and women–all with college degrees, strong leadership abilities, and management skills–can easily find better paying jobs in the private sector. That is, minus the combat stress and strained marriages. To make matters worse, private security companies such as Blackwater and Aegis have entered the scene in a big way. Whereas the military could previously rely on “intangibles” like adventure, patriotism, and novelty, private security companies offer the same for a better price. Last year a typical contract with Blackwater ran between $550-$650 per day. Assuming 3 months on, 3 months off (a typical contractor schedule), that’s easily $100,000 a year with less rules, more vacation time, and better flexibility. If the Army hopes to reverse its officer shortages, it had better look around at the competition and start investing seriously in its leadership. These young patriots deserve it.

2. A 15 month deployment is a 15 month deployment: Even with all the right monetary incentives, nothing can change the fact that the majority of combat units in the Army are now facing two 15-month deployments over the next 3-4 years (30 out of 48 months overseas). Without reducing the OPTEMPO (operational tempo=the pace of deployments) and giving soldiers some sense of predictability, no package of incentives can be effective. The current level of troops is unsustainable, and must be reduced significantly to give the military a chance to catch its proverbial breath. Maintaining the status quo, even if the political climate in Washington miraculously supports it, will simply break the Army. The Pentagon must come to terms with this reality and develop plans that give a small, long-term, but sustainable troop presence the best chance at success. The other alternative–complete, forced withdrawal–is both unrealistic and catastrophic for national security objectives. Pandora’s box is open now, for better or worse. Walking away is not an option, but neither is keeping 140,000 troops deployed.

3. “Lies my Recruiter Told to Me”: The final point is one better understood by those serving overseas. For many (if not most) of the dedicated officers and soldiers serving in frontline combat units, “wanting to make a difference” figures strongly in the equation. That being said, conditions in Iraq can often mean “making a difference” is nearly impossible. The complaints are far too numerous to list here, but to name a few: The bureaucracy of war has become fully entrenched–commanding officers are often ‘chained to their desks’, forced to create elaborate powerpoint slides for mission approval and left to answer dozens of secure email messages every day. Rules of engagement continue to grow more detailed and restrictive over time. Captains, expecting the authority to command their companies and wage a counterinsurgency campaign, are often micromanaged by Colonels that grew up under the old Army paradigm of centralized control and top-down orders. The military is still largely alone in the reconstruction effort. Units are regularly asked to conduct the whole range of projects–building schools, supervising elections, holding clinics–with minimal cooperation from other US agencies, civil society, and private contractors. Even “company commander” slots, the most coveted position for young Captains, are few and far between. Young officers typically rotate into the position for a year, then spend the rest of their time on a staff–at a desk and away from troops. The end result is easy to see: Officers who joined with the best intentions find themselves frustrated, discouraged, and ultimately in search of another job.

While there are certainly more reasons that the Army’s new incentive plan is destined to falter, this is a blog not a book… Please, let’s have a discussion.